Post-Brexit – Does the EU seek closer ties to Britain?
Updated: Jul 5
Economy |
What Happened? A backtrack from Brexit
Many of us will still remember the day we woke up to the news that the UK would be leaving the European Union. This followed the results of the once-in-a-generation referendum back in 2016. Referendums are few and far between, and rarely has there been the economic consequences of one such as this, which can affect many generations to come.
A Post-Brexit World
Ten years after the Brexit vote, the question of whether the European Union wants a closer trading relationship with Britain has resurfaced with new urgency. The UK’s departure fundamentally reshaped economic ties, pulling it out of the Single Market and Customs Union and introducing new frictions that have contributed to slower growth in goods trade and a long‑term decline in product variety. Yet the EU remains Britain’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 40% of UK exports and more than half of its imports 1 —a reality that continues to bind the two sides economically even as political relations fluctuate. As both economies confront shifting global pressures, from supply chain instability to geopolitical uncertainty, the debate is no longer simply about revisiting Brexit, but about whether pragmatic cooperation can replace the ideological divides of the past decade.
In the decade since the 2016 referendum, EU attitudes toward the UK have moved through several distinct phases—initial shock, defensive consolidation, and now a more measured pragmatism. In the immediate aftermath, Brussels’ priority was protecting the integrity of the Single Market, which meant taking a firm line in negotiations and resisting any arrangement that risked encouraging other exits. But as the years passed, the tone gradually softened. Public opinion across major EU states has shifted toward favouring closer ties with Britain, with a Europe‑wide survey showing a majority now supports rebuilding connections with the UK. At the institutional level, tensions over the Northern Ireland Protocol eased after the Windsor Framework, opening the door to more constructive engagement and cooperation across areas such as research, defence, and competition 2. While the EU remains clear that Brexit cannot be undone through the back door, its stance has evolved from managing a rupture to exploring how a stable, mutually beneficial partnership can function outside the old membership model.
If you zoom in on the numbers, the UK and EU look a bit like a divorced couple who still see each other every week because they share a dog. The EU is still the UK’s biggest trading partner by a mile.
“The UK exported £358 billion of goods and services to the EU in 2024. 41% of all UK exports were to the EU. Imports from the EU amounted to £454 billion (51% of all UK imports).” 3
The Rotterdam Effect
All of these figures do not account for what is known as the Rotterdam Effect – this is the theory that the UK’s trade with the Netherlands (and consequently the EU) is artificially inflated owing to goods being dispatched to or arriving from the port of Rotterdam, even if the source or eventual destination country is elsewhere.
This will also have a potential knock-on effect, as some trade recorded with the Netherlands, and thus the EU, may ultimately be with non-EU countries. The scale of this effect is not known – a 2015 ONS article on the subject said:
There are legitimate, proven reasons as to why trade with the Netherlands is high, even relative to its population. It is also reasonable to assume that trade with the Netherlands suffers from an element of distortion. However, it is not possible to estimate, with any certainty, the impact that the Rotterdam effect has on UK trade with the Netherlands and its subsequent impact on UK trade with EU and non-EU countries. In 2024, the Netherlands accounted for 7-8% of total UK goods exports and imports. Even if a high proportion of this trade were ultimately with non-EU countries, the EU would remain the UK’s largest trading partner by a considerable margin. 4
Even with all the post‑Brexit paperwork and grumbling, the flow of goods hasn’t collapsed—if anything, it’s settled into a new, slightly awkward rhythm. Monthly ONS data shows EU imports creeping up, and overall trade volumes continuing to grow, even if no one’s exactly popping champagne about it. The big picture? The economic ties are still strong, still necessary, and still too big for either side to pretend they don’t matter.
When it comes to the political appetite for a new UK–EU deal, both sides are acting a bit like exes who won’t admit they still text each other. In London, there’s a growing recognition—quiet in public, louder in private—that the current setup is clunky and holding back businesses, especially small exporters drowning in paperwork. No one wants to reopen the Brexit wars, but there is a mood for smoothing the rough edges.
Over in Brussels, the vibe has shifted, too.
The EU isn’t exactly rolling out a red carpet, but it’s also not slamming the door shut. Officials talk about “pragmatic cooperation” and “targeted improvements,” which is EU‑speak for: we’re open to tweaks, as long as you don’t expect a full reunion. The political class on both sides knows the relationship isn’t working as efficiently as it could. While neither wants to look like they’re crawling back, there’s definitely an appetite for something more grown‑up, more stable, and less performatively hostile than the post‑2016 era.
How this plays with UK voters is where things get messy, because the country is still carrying the emotional hangover of 2016. For a lot of people, anything that even smells like revisiting Brexit triggers an instant eye‑roll or a full‑body shudder. But here’s the twist: most voters aren’t actually ideologically dug in anymore—they’re just tired. Tired of the drama, tired of the paperwork stories, tired of hearing businesses complain about red tape. Polls consistently show that a majority of the public now supports a closer relationship with the EU, not because they want to rewind history, but because they want things to work properly again. The hardcore Brexit‑vs‑Remain divide has softened into something more practical: if a new deal makes life easier and doesn’t reopen the old wars, most voters will shrug and say “fine, just get on with it.” The only real danger is political framing—if it’s sold as a betrayal, it becomes toxic; if it’s sold as fixing the plumbing, people barely blink.
Labour's EU Future
For the current Labour government, edging toward a closer relationship with the EU is a political tightrope, and they know it. Their lead in the polls isn’t the ironclad mandate it might look like on paper — it’s softer, more volatile, and built on voters who are tired of chaos rather than united behind a grand vision. That means any move that even resembles reopening the question of Brexit risks spooking parts of their coalition. Some voters want smoother trade; others hear “alignment” and think “here we go again.” So Labour has to tread carefully, framing any shift as practical housekeeping rather than a dramatic change of course. One wrong signal, one headline that sounds too nostalgic for the pre‑2016 world, and they could find themselves fighting on political terrain they’d much rather avoid.
There are clear signs that the UK and the EU are inching back toward alignment, especially when major global shocks force everyone to reassess their priorities. The recent US–Venezuela military escalation has acted as a kind of geopolitical stress test, reminding both London and Brussels that—like it or not—they still share the same neighbourhood and many of the same vulnerabilities. In moments like this, the old Brexit-era point‑scoring suddenly feels small. You can see it in the UK’s closer coordination with EU partners on sanctions, energy security, and diplomatic messaging, and in the EU’s willingness to treat Britain as a serious strategic player rather than a wayward ex-member. None of this means a grand reunion is on the cards, but it does show that when global events get loud, the UK and EU instinctively drift toward shared interests rather than old arguments.
Why It Matters
In the end, the question isn’t whether the UK and EU want a closer trading relationship — it’s whether they can navigate the politics, history, and public mood long enough to make one happen. A decade on from the referendum, both sides are older, slightly bruised, and a lot more realistic about what they actually need from each other. The UK wants smoother trade without reopening old wounds; the EU wants stability without compromising its own rules. And voters, frankly, just want the drama dialled down. If the next few years are handled with a bit of honesty and a lot of calm, there’s room for a more grown‑up partnership to emerge — not a grand reunion, but a practical, mutually useful arrangement that reflects where Europe and Britain really are now, not where they were in 2016.
The opportunity is there; the question is whether the post-Brexit politics will let anyone take it.
Sources
1. - Statistics on UK trade with the EU, Research Briefing, House of Commons Library (22 April 2025)
2 - A new way forward on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, European Commission (27 Feb 2023, ec.europa.eu/commission
3, 4 - Statistics on UK trade with the EU, Research Briefing, House of Commons Library (22 April 2025)
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